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When life hands you Lemons, use them: The Establishment Clause in the 21st Century as Applied 
to Legislative-Led Prayer  
I. Introduction  
 Imagine you have recently moved to a new town. You have a list of board requests to make at the 
next local board meeting and to ensure you make a positive impression, you arrive early and personally 
introduce yourself to each member.  The board meeting is about to start, when one of the board members 
instructs you to stand for prayer.  As a self-professed pagan, being forced to worship Jesus Christ is 
bothersome.  You are at a crossroad: do you remain seated and jeopardize your chances of being granted 
permission from the board for your requests or do you reluctantly stand in order to seek a favorable 
ruling?  The cases explored throughout this note will illustrate this scenario in greater detail, and 
demonstrate how legislative regulation of prayer is unconstitutional.  
There is a long history of chaplain-led prayer that Courts have found to be consistent with the 
Establishment Clause.1  Courts have even gone so far as to hold that open invitation to local clergy, even 
if it ends up being predominately Christian, is consistent with the Establishment Clause.2   Now, 
however, a new practice has arisen: the legislators themselves offering the prayers.3  The Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits have issued conflicting opinions interpreting the constitutionality of legislative-led prayers, 
creating a spirited circuit split.4 
                                                        
1 See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785, 793-95 (1983). 
2 See also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813 (2014)(holding that clergy led prayer 
which is mostly Christian is consistent with the Establishment Clause, as long as the practice is 
neither discriminatory or coercive in nature). 
3 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. of 
Jackson, 870 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2017). 
4 Id.  
The Establishment Clause (“the Clause”) protects individuals who are unwilling to conform to 
legislative-led prayers.5  For years, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been in 
disarray.6  As such, and unsurprisingly, circuit court judges are divided, on the constitutionality of the 
issue related to which standard applies to the review of cases challenging the Clause.7  Recently, the 
Fourth Circuit ruled en banc that legislative-led prayers violate the Establishment Clause, asserting that 
the constitutionality of this issue has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.8  
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit diverted, also en banc, and found instead that legislative-led prayer was 
indeed constitutional, based upon a “historical analysis.”9  The constitutionality of legislative-led prayer 
is uncertain until the Supreme Court speaks.10 
This note will explore the Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the considerable impact history 
has had on legislative-led prayer. Section II will discuss the various approaches to the Establishment 
Clause.11  Section III will recount the history of the Clause in the United States and examine the Supreme 
Court of the United States position on legislative prayer cases.12  Section IV will analyze the current split 
in authority between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in regards to the legislators themselves offering the 
                                                        
5 Robert Destro, The Court after Scalia: “An establishment of religion”, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 12, 
2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-an-establishment-of-
religion/.  
6 See supra note 3. 
7 Id.   
8 Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017). 




11 These tests include the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); the endorsement 
test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); the coercion test, Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); and the “historical analysis”, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 
(1983).  
12 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813 
(2014).  
prayers’.13  Finally, Section V will use the facts of both circuit court cases to contend that legislative-led 
prayers are impermissible under the Establishment Clause.14 
II. Establishment Clause Approaches 
The judiciary’s primary role is to protect rights guaranteed under the Constitution.15  The First 
Amendment provides that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”16  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment Clause 
applies to both the States and to the Federal Government.17  The judiciary’s role is to protect the 
aforementioned rights guaranteed under the Constitution.18  Historically, the courts have understood the 
importance of separation between religion and state,19 and have held that “religion is a private matter for 
the individual, the family, and the institution of private choice.”20  In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court held 
that the Establishment Clause is designed to protect against three main evils: “(1) sponsorship; (2) 
financial support; and (3) active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”21  In order for a law 
to comply with the Establishment Clause, it must “(1) have secular legislative purpose; (2) the principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the policy must not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”22  It is important to note that the Supreme 
Court recognized how unrealistic it is for complete separation between church and state,23 and thus 
                                                        
13 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. of 
Jackson, 870 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2017). 
14 Id.   
15 U.S. CONST. art. III.  
16 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
17 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
18 U.S. Const. art. III. 
19  Everson, 330 U.S. 1. “Neither a state or the federal government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organization and vice versa” Id. at 16 
20 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).  
21 Id. at 612-13.  
22 Id. at 612. 
23 Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 614 (1971). 
implied that there are instances where a “relationship between government and religious organizations” is 
considered both permissible and required contact.24  Specifically, zoning regulations, fire inspections, and 
compulsory school-attendance are unavoidable and permissible.25  Despite the fact that total separation 
between church and state is unrealistic in many contexts, it is possible and practical in the legislative 
setting.26  Each of the aforementioned permissive contacts between government and religious 
organizations involve a situation where the government’s objective is to further ensure the safety and 
overall wellbeing of society. Dissimilarly, legislative-led prayer does not call for such action.27 
While the Lemon test continues to be used in many contexts, other tests have emerged, including 
the Endorsement and Coercion tests.28  The Endorsement test was used in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
where the Court considered whether holiday displays on public property were constitutional.29  Under 
this test, the Establishment Clause is violated when a reasonable observer would infer that the 
government “endorses religion.”30  The test ensures that government action does not convey the 
“message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”31  This is a mere modification of Lemon’s purpose and effects prongs. The purpose prong 
asks whether the government’s legitimate intention’s is to endorse or reject religion.32  On the other hand, 
the effects prong asks whether a “reasonable observer” would infer the government’s act as endorsement 
                                                        
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id.  
27 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017).  
28 The endorsement test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); the 
coercion test, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
29 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989). 
30 Id.  
31 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
32 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 619. 
or rejection of their particular religious belief.33  The majority applied the endorsement test to determine 
that a religious symbol placed prominently in a government building violated the Establishment Clause, 
while a religious symbol surrounded by secular symbols and civic signs did not.34  For the first time, a 
majority of the Court chose the language of the endorsement test as a new way to analyze Establishment 
Clause quandaries.35 
   In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, he proposed a second alternative to the Lemon test, focusing 
solely on the effects prong.36  He concentrated on coercion, both direct and indirect, contending that the 
government may not coerce citizens to take part in or support “any religion or its exercise.”37  Although 
the majority refused to agree with his line of reasoning, this “coercion” test has been used on occasion to 
decide the constitutionality of Establishment Clause violations in later cases before the Court.38   
III. Jurisprudence of Legislative Prayer 
The Court has on two occasions addressed the issue of prayers given at the start of a legislative 
session: by a chaplain and by invited members of local clergy.39  In its first case, Marsh v. Chambers, a 
member of the Nebraska Legislature sued in federal court asserting that prayers offered by a state-
selected and state-funded chaplain before a legislative session, violated the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.40  Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit Court applied the three-prong Lemon 
test, holding that state employment of a paid Presbyterian minister violated the Constitution.41 The 
                                                        
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 579. 
35 Id. at 589. 
36 Id. at 658. (Kennedy, A., dissenting). 
37 Id.  
38 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 587 (1992). 
39 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813 
(2014). 
40 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983). 
41 Id. at 785-86. (Citing Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
district court did not find that a paid chaplain offering nonsectarian prayers was per se 
unconstitutional,42 however a “single minister being paid to offer legislative prayer . . . over an extended 
period of time” is excessive entanglement which violated the First Amendment.43  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed the lower courts, holding that employment of the paid minister by the 
state to open legislative session with the invocation of prayer was constitutional.44  
The Court deviated from the Lemon test, which, at the time had been consistently used in Establishment 
Clause cases for over a decade, and instead employed a “historical standard” in order to determine 
whether there was an Establishment Clause violation.45  When applying the “historical standard,” the 
court must identify historical patterns.46  The Court found that prayers given in front of legislature are 
historically permissible,47 contending that such a prayer is “deeply embedded in the history and tradition 
of this country.”48  The Founding Fathers clearly did not view the practice as violating the Establishment 
Clause, as three days after they authorized the appointment of paid chaplains in the First Congress they 
adopted the exact language in the Bill of Rights.49  Moreover, the majority determined that the content of 
legislative prayer was irrelevant to judges if there is no evidence that the prayers had been “exploited to 
proselytize any one, or to disparage any other faith or belief.”50  Since there was no evidence that the 
prayers exploited or disparaged one particular faith, the Court thus declined to engage in a fact sensitive 
analysis to determine if the content of prayers were unfair. 51 
                                                        
42 Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 235.  
43 Id. 
44 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 786-88. 
45 Id. at 795.  
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48Chambers, 463 U.S. at 786.  
49 Id. at 790.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
The dissent was reluctant to support a ruling based upon unique history, stating courts “should not 
rely heavily on the advice of the founding fathers because the message of history often tends to be 
ambiguous and not relevant to a society far more heterogeneous than that of the framers.”52  Absent the 
long history of legislative prayer by the Founding Fathers, the dissent found that the practice is 
unconstitutional.53  Holding that it is a mere assumption that the Framers of the Establishment Clause 
would not have permitted an act that they believed to be unconstitutional and in violation of the clause.54  
James Madison, who authorized the appointment of paid chaplain’s in the First Congress, later revealed 
that he believed this practice to be unconstitutional.55  After Marsh the Court went back to applying the 
Lemon test, or tests of endorsement or coercion; but it did not rely on a “historical approach.”56  Since 
this ruling, some courts have described Marsh as an outlier.57  
Over thirty years later, in 2015, Town of Greece v. Galloway revisited the “historical analysis” of 
legislative prayer under Marsh.58  The plaintiffs, represented by Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State (“AU”), contended that the legislative prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment, by preferring Christian chaplains instead of non-Christian chaplains and by 
permitting volunteer chaplain led prayer.59  The town adhered to an “informal method for selecting prayer 
                                                        
52 Id. at 791. (Citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237) (Brennan, J.,  
concurring) (1963)).  
53 Chambers, 463 U.S. 814.  
54 Id. at 814-15.  
55 Id. at 815; Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 WM. & MARY QUARTERLY 534, 558 
(1946). 
56 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 40 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (contending that Marsh was an outlier because of the “extremely   
long and unambiguous history” of legislative prayer); Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Marsh is one-of-a-kind[.]”) 
57 Id. 
58 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1816 (2014). 
59 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196–97 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 
givers, all of whom were unpaid volunteers.”60  The guest clergy were allowed to devise the prayers, 
based upon their own religious beliefs.61  All of the participating clergy were Christian, and thus, the 
prayers were predominantly Christian.62  The district court dismissed the claim and held the practice to be 
constitutional,63 asserting that under Marsh, legislative prayers are not required to be nonsectarian.64  The 
Second Circuit reversed, holding the practice to be an impermissible affiliation with Christianity.65  
Under the “totality of the circumstances” a reasonable observer would view this practice as the town 
being affiliated with a particular religion, Christianity.66  
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit.67  In reaffirming Marsh, it held 
that prayers offered by volunteer clergy before a legislative session, were constitutional.68  Justice 
Kennedy concluded that, “the town of Greece [did] not violate the First Amendment by opening its 
meetings with prayers that comport with our tradition and does not coerce participation by non-
adherents.”69  Although obligated to preserve a policy of nondiscrimination, the town is not required to 
hunt for non-Christian clergy outside of its borders.70  The town did not violate the Constitution simply 
because most clergy who offered prayers had a strong affiliation with Christianity.71  The majority of the 
court contended that mandating nonsectarian prayer was actually prohibited.72  Instruction of 
nonsectarian prayer would force legislators and courts to censor prayer, generating greater government 
                                                        
60 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1819.  
63 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196–97 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 
64 Id. at 219, 241. 
65 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012). 
66 Id.  
67 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1828. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1824. 
72 Id. at 1822. 
entanglement than the town’s current practice.73  Justice Kennedy’s stance on nonsectarian prayer 
instructions is consistent with his holding in Lee v. Weisman, where he held the practice to be a means by 
which the government impermissibly “directs and controls the content of prayers.”74  
Notably, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court considered a public prayer policy at a public high school 
graduation ceremony, wherein the principal, a government figure, had invited a clergy member to offer 
invocation and prayers.75  The principal advised the clergy member that his prayers must be 
nonsectarian.76  Plaintiff sought a “permanent injunction barring petitioners, from inviting the clergy to 
deliver invocations . . . at future graduations.”77  The district court applied the Lemon test and found the 
public prayer policy violated the Establishment Clause.78  Petitioners subsequently appealed, and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.79  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
affirmed the First Circuits holding.80 
The Supreme Court noted that the nonsectarian instruction constituted a means by which the 
government impermissibly “directed and controlled the content of prayers.”81  According to Justice 
Kennedy, the content of the nonsectarian prayer placed indirect coercive pressure on students to 
participate.82  The dissent, on the other hand, raised a compelling argument that attendance was 
voluntary, therefore the students were not coerced to attend.83  However, absence from graduation had—
                                                        
73 Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1822.  
74 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 588-89 (1992). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 584.  
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 585.  
80 Weisman, 505 U.S at 586.  
81 Id. at 588-89.  
82 Id. at 577, 592.  
83 Id. at 642.  
and still has—significant effects on students, leaving them with no “real choice” but to attend.84  While 
the factual context of Lee is different from that of legislative prayer, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
asserted that government instruction of prayer content is impermissible.85  
Furthermore, in Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy found that the town’s prayer practice did not 
coerce participation by non-adherents,86 basing his reasoning on the history of legislative prayer.87  A 
reasonable observer is familiar with traditions of legislative prayer, and understands the purpose is to 
show appreciation towards religion, not for the government to coerce non-adherents.88  Prayer practice is 
analyzed as a whole, instead of as within the content of a single prayer.89  Justice Kennedy is not only 
used a historical approach in his analysis, but he has also incorporated the elements of the coercion test 
and even the endorsement test. The “reasonable observer” language comes from the endorsement test.90  
However, Justice Kennedy’s use of this approach suggests that it is not reasonable to think this prayer 
practice is coercive, especially since the legislative context with a citizen audience differs from the school 
context with impressionable children. Accordingly, an independent constituent feeling offended by a 
particular prayer does not violate the Constitution. 91 
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion instead focused on the Town of Greece’s violation of the “norm of 
religious equality.”92  Although Justice Kagan agreed with the Court’s decision in Marsh, she 
differentiated the legislative prayer practices in Marsh from those in Town of Greece.93  First, the 
                                                        
84 Id. at 577, 595. 
85 Id. at 577, 592; https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/who-said-that-a-simple-question-
that-may-change-the-way-courts-view-legislative-prayer 
86 Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1824.  
90 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989). 
91 Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
92 Id. at 1841. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 1842.  
location where the chaplain-led prayers took place is considerably different.94  Marsh took place at a 
congressional session,95 whereas, Town of Greece took place at a local town meeting.96  Second, the 
prayers that took place in these two locations have differing audiences.97  In Marsh, the chaplains 
directed the prayer only to the elected state representatives, since “members of the public take no part in 
the proceedings.”98  Whereas, in Town of Greece, the town meetings included extensive involvement by 
citizens, who were there to discuss local affairs with their government.99  Consequently, the prayers being 
offered by the Christian chaplains were directed to the public, regardless of their particular religious 
beliefs.100  Lastly, the content of the prayers significantly differ. In Marsh, the chaplains removed all 
Christian references from the prayers, therefore not advancing one particular faith or belief over 
another.101  However, in Town of Greece, the prayers were explicitly Christian for close to a decade, and 
the town made no effort to remove the sectarian references from the prayers.102   
Justice Kagan asserted how explicit the command of the Establishment Clause is, emphasizing 
that, “one religious denomination can not be officially preferred over another one.”103  Justice Kagan also 
suggested ways in which the town could have employed religious equality, for example, town council 
members could have instructed Christian chaplains to give nonsectarian and generic prayers, or they 
could have invited chaplains of minority religious groups to give the prayers.104  
                                                        
94 Id. at 1847. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1847. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 1848. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Greece, 134 S. Ct at 1843.  
104 Id. at 1851. 
The Supreme Court has established two ways in which legislative prayer is consistent with the 
Establishment Clause.105  Legislative prayers are permitted when given by a paid chaplain offering 
nonsectarian prayers.106  Also, legislative prayers are permitted when given by various clergy members, 
of different faiths, offering sectarian prayers when a neutral selection process has been used.107  
IV. Circuit Split  
There are four standard tests the courts regularly apply to determine whether an Establishment 
Clause violation exists: the Lemon test, the Endorsement test, the Coercion test and, the “historical 
analysis” test.108  The Circuit Courts have been confronted by an area of first impression, prayers led not 
by clergy but by government officials themselves.109  These legislative-led prayer practices differ 
substantially from previous Supreme Court cases, because invocations are reserved solely for board 
members.110  The decisions made in Marsh and Town of Greece did not concern legislative-led prayer, 
therefore, they do not resolve whether this particular prayer practice is constitutional.111  The Fourth and 
Sixth Circuit have issued conflicting opinions interpreting the constitutionality of legislative-led prayers, 
creating a spirited circuit split, in Lund v. Rowan Cty., and Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson.112 
                                                        
105 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813 
(2014). 
106 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983). 
107 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct at 1842. 
108 These tests include the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); the endorsement 
test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); the coercion test, Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); and the “historical analysis”, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 
(1983).  
109 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. 
of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2017). 
110 Id. 
111 See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. 
Ct. 1813 (2014). 
112 Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 275 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 
525 (6th Cir. 2017). 
In Lund v. Rowan Cty., in 2015, residents of Rowan County, North Carolina, filed suit against the 
county, alleging claims of Establishment Clause violations.113  Plaintiffs alleged that the County Board of 
Commissioner’s delivered sectarian legislative prayers and coerced non-adherents to participate.114  The 
board members led predominately Christian prayers on a rotating basis115 and no one other than the 
members, were permitted to offer invocations.116  Facing the audience, the members would usually invite 
those present to pray with them, and the prayers almost always included Christian doctrinal references.117  
Over ninety-seven percent of the prayers were Christian.118  The district court distinguished this case 
from Town of Greece, finding that legislative-led prayer made legislators impermissible supervisors of 
prayer and religious speech.119  Legislative-led prayer it argued, leads to “a closed-universe of prayer 
givers” discriminating against minority religious groups.120  
Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
reversing the lower court and holding that legislative-led prayer is a long-standing American tradition.121 
The court specifically found that legislative-led prayer was comparable to chaplain-led prayer, since the 
Supreme Court had remained silent on such practice.122  The Supreme Court has never specified whether 
a speaker’s identity should be required as part of the analysis123 and, therefore, it was unreasonable to 
                                                        
113 Lund v. Rowan Cty., 103 F. Supp. 3d 715 (M.D.N.C 2015).  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 716.  
116 Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272.  
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 273.  
119 Supra note 96 at 723. 
120 Id. 
121 Lund, 837 F.3d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2016). 
122 Id. at 418. 
123 Id.  
assert that silence on the issue equates to disapproval of the practice.124  The court also pointed out that 
legislative-led prayer is intended for the lawmakers themselves to enjoy, not for the public.125 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that the invocations were not coercive.126  Coercive 
invocations occur when legislators seek to sway nonbelievers or censor those who believe differently.127 
For example, if the prayers’ nature and purpose was intended to “convert others to that belief” or “belittle 
those who believed differently” than the invocations would be coercive and therefore unconstitutional 
under Town of Greece.128  However, when examining the prayer practice as a whole, as required by Town 
of Greece, no violation of the Constitution exists.129  The court went as far as to hold that “a few remarks 
are insufficient to despoil a practice that on the whole reflects and embraces our tradition.”130  
On rehearing en banc, however, the full Fourth Circuit reversed and determined that Rowan 
County’s practice of legislative-led prayer was repugnant the Establishment Clause.131  The court held 
that “Marsh and Town of Greece in no way sought to dictate the outcome of every subsequent case.”132  
In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court conceded that they have yet to define the Establishment Clause’s 
precise boundaries.133  Since Marsh and Town of Greece were not sought to determine the 
constitutionality of legislative-led prayer, the Fourth Circuit must carry out a fact sensitive analysis of the 
prayer practice.134 
                                                        
124 Id. 
125 Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d at 420. 
126 Id. at 421.  
127 Id. at 422.  
128 Id 
129 Id. at 422; Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1824 (2014). 
130 Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d at 422-23.  
131 Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 275 (4th Cir. 2017) 
132 Id at 276. 
133 Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d at 276; Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.  
134 Lund, N.C., 863 F.3D 275 at 276.  
The fact sensitive analysis paid special attention to the identity of the prayer giver.135  Prayer 
opportunity was strictly reserved for the Commissioners, which created a “closed universe of prayer 
givers.”136  In a five-year span, only “four out of one hundred and forty-three prayers were non-
sectarian.”137  Invocations were in accordance to legislator’s specific faiths and the prayers proclaimed 
that Christianity was exceptional and superior to other faiths.138  A notable amount of prayers, portrayed 
Christianity as “the one and only way to salvation”, which implies that all other faiths are inferior, thus, 
coercing participation by non-adherents.139  Additionally, the audience booed a town member, who had 
expressed opposition to the Board members’ prayer practices.140   
These facts are clearly distinguishable from prior Supreme Court cases. In Marsh and Town of 
Greece, expansion of faiths for prayer practices was practical by welcoming clergy of different faiths.141  
Here, however, the only form of recourse is to vote for a board member with similar religious views.142  
As pointed out in Lemon, “political divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political 
process,” and is consequently “one of the principle evils against which the First Amendment was 
intended to protect.”143   
In Bormuth v. Cnty. Of Jackson, the Board of Commissioners in Jackson County, Michigan 
opened each monthly meeting with legislative-led prayer.144  Each commissioner was afforded a chance 
to open session, without the content of prayers being reviewed.145  To refrain from hearing prayers they 
                                                        
135 Id. at 279.  
136 Id. at 282.  
137 Id. at 283.  
138 Id. at 281-82, 284. 
139 Id. at 284.  
140 Lund, N.C., 863 F.3D 275 at 282.  
141 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1820-21.  
142 Lund, N.C., 863 F.3D 275 at 282. 
143 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.  
144 Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 849 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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disagreed with, the Board members refused to allow non-commissioners to offer invocations.146  Plaintiff, 
a self-professed pagan attended meetings because he sought appointment to serve on Jackson Counties 
Solid Waste Planning Committee.147  While in attendance, a commissioner requested for the public to 
“rise and assume a reverent position.”148  Plaintiff was the only member of the public who did not “rise 
and bow his head.”149  Feeling excluded, he raised this First Amendment issue during the public-
comment period.150  The Board members were unresponsive to his concerns, and reacted with 
“disgust.”151  As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against the County, contending claims of Establishment 
Clause violations, advocating for the Lemon test to be applied.152  While his suit was pending, the 
Commissioners rejected his application to serve on committee and appointed two other less-qualified 
individuals to serve.153  The district court found that legislative-led prayer was consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Marsh and Town of Greece, and therefore did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.154  Plaintiff subsequently appealed.155   
In its review, the Sixth Circuit found that the Board of Commissioners violated the Establishment 
Clause because legislative-led prayer was “outside the tradition of historically tolerated prayers.”156  
Also, the Sixth Circuit found that the invocations coerced residents to participate.157  The court 
established that the Board’s practice fell outside the tradition of legislative prayer in Marsh and Town of 
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Greece,158 and found the most distinguishable factor to be the identity of the prayer giver, contending that 
the Courts evaluation of prayer practice may be different if town board members were leading the 
prayers.159  As held in Town of Greece, the Sixth Circuit noted that the government is forbidden from 
coercing its citizens “to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”160  Moreover, in Town of 
Greece, Justice Kennedy asserted, “the analysis may be different if town board members directed the 
public to participate in prayers or singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decision 
might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”161  In Bourmuth, the Sixth 
Circuit found all three of the afore-mentioned elements to be satisfied.162  First, the Board instructs the 
public to join in prayers at the meetings.163  Second, the Board has unambiguously “singled out 
Bourmuth for opprobrium.”164  Lastly, the Plaintiff presented compelling proof that the Board had 
“allocated benefits and burdens based on participation in the prayer.”165 
When the full circuit heard the case en banc, however, it reversed and found that Jackson 
County’s practice of legislative-led prayer was consistent with Marsh and Town of Greece, and did not in 
fact violate the Establishment Clause.166  Although the Plaintiff here advocated for the Lemon test to be 
applied, the Sixth Circuit held that test was irrelevant and using it would “rewrite thirty-plus years of 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence.”167  Instead, the court used a “historical standard” to determine whether 
there was an Establishment Clause violation.168  It found that neither Marsh nor Town of Greece 
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controlled who the prayer giver was,169 and asserted that, “since the founding of our Republic, Congress, 
Legislatures, and many municipal bodies have commenced legislative sessions with prayer.”170 
Additionally, the court found that a pattern of coercion against non-adherents is needed, to establish a 
constitutional violation.171  Therefore, a challenge based on one prayer, which denigrates nonbelievers, is 
permissible.172 
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Town of Greece is 
controlling within this circuit.173  Although the previous Sixth Circuit found all three elements of Justice 
Kennedys coercion test to be satisfied, the Sixth Circuit en banc ultimately held differently.174  First, it 
held that a request for members of the “public to assist in prayer by rising and remaining quiet” was not 
coercive and therefore constitutional.175  Second, it held that the Commissioners raising their backs to the 
Plaintiffs, was constitutionally sound, and “not indicative of a pattern and practice of coercion” towards 
non-adherents.176  Lastly, Plaintiff assumed that the County deliberately rejected his application based 
upon his pending suit, and thus, amounted to a frivolous claim.177 
Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuit used different approaches to determine whether or not an 
Establishment Clause violation existed.178  The Fourth Circuit did not use a formal test to achieve its 
constitutional analysis, but instead held that Establishment Clause inquiries are matters of degree,179 
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basing their evaluation on the circumstances surrounding the legislative-led prayer.180  The Sixth Circuit, 
on the other hand, held the Lemon test to be inapplicable to legislative-led prayer case.181  Instead, the 
court applied both a “historical analysis” and coercion test to determine whether or not an Establishment 
Clause violation existed.182  Consequently, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have issued conflicting opinions 
interpreting the constitutionality of legislative-led prayers, creating a circuit split.183 
V. Impermissibility of Legislative-Led Prayer under Town of Greece, Marsh and Lemon 
A. Constitutionality Fails Under a “Historical Analysis”  
Our nation’s history does not encompass prayers by legislators, and, as has been observed, 
legislative-led prayer is different from clergy authorized prayers. 184  Although the Sixth Circuit argues 
that legislative-led prayer is permissible under both a Marsh and Town of Greece analysis, the facts are 
vastly distinguishable between the cases.185  There is a difference between extending prayers to 
lawmakers, and limiting prayers solely to lawmakers.186  Also, there is not one authority that confirms 
that Congress engaged in similar practices of legislative-led prayer.187  Although the Supreme Court has 
cited instances of legislative-led prayer, none occurred before 1973, and is therefore not indicative of 
contemporary practices.188  Accordingly, history is irrelevant to this analysis. 
B. Constitutionality Fails Under a Coercion Test 
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held in Lee v. Weisman held that instructing clergy to 
give prayers that are nonsectarian constituted a means by which the government impermissibly “directed 
and controlled the content of prayers.”189  Instruction of nonsectarian prayer was found impermissible 
because it would force legislators and courts to censor prayer, generating even greater government 
entanglement than the town’s current practice.190  Legislative-led prayer cases illustrate exactly that 
excessive government entanglement.191  Justice Kennedy feared precisely these circumstances.192  
Concluding that it would be a different story, if council members instructed the public to pray, shamed 
anyone who refused to pray, or indicated that a members decisions might be contingent on whether they 
pray or not.193  In both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the invocation practices were coercive in nature, 
whereas in the Town of Greece, the government had not intentionally discriminated against non-
Christians.194 
C. Proposal to use Lemon test for Legislative-Led Prayers  
If a law student were prompted by a professor to answer the question of whether legislative-led 
prayer was constitutional, he or she would answer that it was unconstitutional, based upon a Lemon 
analysis.195  The Establishment Clause’s fundamental objective is to ensure religious neutrality, in order 
to respect the religious beliefs of all citizens.196  In Lemon, the Court held that the three main evils in 
which the Establishment Clause was intended to protect are: “(1) sponsorship; (2) financial support; 
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[and] (3) active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”197  Legislative-led prayer is in direct 
violation with the first and third element. In both of these cases, local board members, who are apart of 
the government, are not only sponsoring the advancement of certain religions but also are actively 
involved in such religious activity.   
Under the facts of both circuit court cases, Lemon is the most efficient test to use to ensure that 
the Nations values are preserved. It is superior to the “historical approach” because it is better at 
addressing the relevant values at stake. The “historical approach” places too much weight on the 
founding fathers message of history, which often tends to be vague and inapplicable to a far more 
diverse society.198  Indeed, we have no clear historical example of prayer being led by the legislators 
themselves.  
Both the coercion and endorsement test are used in specific circumstances.199  As seen in Lee v. 
Weisman, the psychological coercion test is frequently used in the school context,200 whereas the 
endorsement test is more appropriate to use when assessing the context of religious symbols, such as in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.201  It is arguable that these tests could be used when reviewing 
legislative-led prayers, but they are highly context-specific tests. Lemon provides a way to draw a line 
between chaplain and clergy-led prayers on the one hand, and legislative-led prayer on the other. 
Consequently, it is more appropriate to use the Lemon test in cases involving legislative-led prayer.  
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The Lemon test best addresses these evils by requiring a court to determine if a States policy 
survives constitutional scrutiny.202  In order to comply with the Establishment Clause, state action must 
“(1) have secular legislative purpose; (2) the principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; [and] (3) the policy must not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion,”203 Justice Kagan’s dissent in Town of Greece, focused on the towns 
violation of religious equality.204  The town failed to recognize religious diversity, by never seeking to 
“involve, accommodate, or in anyway reach out to adherents of non-Christian religions.”205  Justice 
Kagan suggested ways in which the town could have employed religious equality, such as town council 
members could have instructed Christian chaplains to give nonsectarian and generic prayers, or they 
could have invited chaplains of minority religious groups to give the prayers.206  However, those 
suggestions were never employed.207  Therefore, the towns practice was in direct violation with the 
“First Amendment’s promise that every citizen, irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in her 
government.”208  In both circuit court cases, there is no way to achieve religious equality, precisely 
because the conduct lacks a secular purpose, advances religion as its primary effect, and excessively 
entangles religion with government.209 
 In McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, the Supreme Court held that “a determination of the counties purpose 
is a sound basis for ruling on the Establishment Clause complaints.”210  When the government’s purpose 
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pre-eminently advances religion, it violates the Establishment Clauses fundamental values.211 
Furthermore, the Court held that “examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation for every 
American appellate court.”212  In an Establishment Clause analysis, examining purpose is imperative.213 
The purpose of legislative-led prayer is pre-eminently religious rather than secular. However, the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits do not examine whether these legislative-led prayer policies have a secular 
purpose. This is due to the fact that the historical test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test do not 
require such an analysis.214  However, Lemon’s “purpose” requirement was specifically designed to 
prohibit the government from abandoning neutrality, and the analysis is essential in protecting the rights 
guaranteed under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 215  
Neither the Fourth nor Sixth Circuits disagree that the effects of legislative-led prayer are clearly 
religious.216  The heart of the disputes is whether or not the effects of legislative-led prayer are coercive 
in nature.217  Thus, placing coercive strains upon religious minorities to adhere to the majorities’ 
religious beliefs’.218  The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of prayer, as well as the 
recognition that the Nation is made up of pluralistic people.219  However, the Court was explicit in 
holding that any state action, that’s primary effect is to advance or inhibit one particular religion, is 
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unconstitutional.220  In both instances, legislative-led prayers primary effect is to advance one religion 
over another.221  Accordingly, legislative-led prayer should be deemed unconstitutional.  
Lastly, the practice of legislative-led prayer leads to excessive entanglement between church and 
state.222  In Marsh, the dissent held that “entanglement can take two forms.”223  In cases involving 
legislative prayer, “the process of choosing a suitable chaplain, whether on a permanent or rotating 
basis, and insuring that the chaplain limits himself or herself to suitable prayers involves the sort of 
supervision . . . government should avoid.”224  If the dissent found legislative prayer to be considered 
excessive entanglement, there is no doubt that the Court would find legislative-led prayer to be 
excessive entanglement between church and state.225 
In both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, board members are not only censoring prayers but also 
delivering them, which creates excessive government entanglement.226  The need for impartiality and 
accountability by local boards is essential for local governments to run smoothly. It is pertinent that 
local board members, acting as government officials, remain neutral.  Lemon takes into account the issue 
of fusion of governmental and religious functions, when the church takes over state duties and, as here, 
when the government engages in religious tasks.227 By allowing a state-paid chaplain and private clergy 
to offer prayers, there is still a separation between church and state. However, when the legislators 
themselves are offering prayer, they are participating in a religious task, rather than a government one.  
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Lemon ensures for an across the board holding that these types of prayers have no secular 
purpose, entangle the church and state by getting the state involved in religious functions and has a 
primary effect of advancing religion. Accordingly, legislative-led prayer is incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of the First Amendments Establishment Clause.  
D. Conclusion  
Due to the current circuit split,228 legislators and judges outside of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
may be apprehensive on how to approach the issue of legislative-led prayer. The Fourth Circuit follows 
a fact sensitive analysis,229 acknowledging that the Supreme Court has yet to address legislative-led 
prayer practice, whereas, the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, follows a “historical analysis” and finds 
that legislative-led prayer is in fact consistent with the Court’s precedent.230  Further guidance from the 
Supreme Court is necessary to determine whether legislative-led prayer policies are constitutional or 
not.231 Addressing this question will provide much needed clarity to legislators and judges about what 
the government is permitted to do. Until then, legislators and judges should proceed with caution. 
Perhaps, local board members should resort to diversified prayers of local clergy or nonsectarian prayers 
offered by a state-selected chaplain, which are neither coercive nor discriminatory in nature.  
The Establishment Clause was established to protect individuals who are unwilling to conform to 
legislative-led prayers.232  Therefore, the obvious next move for the Supreme Court is to grant certiorari 
                                                        
228 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. of 
Jackson, 870 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2017). 
229 Lund, 863 F.3d at 275.  
230 Bourmuth, 870 F.3d at 497. 
231 http://dailysignal.com/2017/06/14/2-cases-threaten-shut-public-prayer-supreme-court-may-
need-act/ 
232 Robert Destro, The Court after Scalia: “An establishment of religion”, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 
12, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-an-
establishment-of-religion/. 
and shed light on this issue. This can occur by ending the spirited split between the Circuits and holding 
that legislative-led prayers are impermissible under the Establishment Clause.233  
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